SAFETYLIT WEEKLY UPDATE

We compile citations and summaries of about 400 new articles every week.
RSS Feed

HELP: Tutorials | FAQ
CONTACT US: Contact info

Search Results

Journal Article

Citation

Sites B. Fla. State Univ. Law Rev. 2007; 34(3): 959-996.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, Florida State University, College of Law)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

In spite of thousands of years of science, humankind is distinctly unable to predict the future. And yet, the judicial system is called upon to do just so daily. In bail considerations, judges predict flight risk. In parole hearings, officials contemplate the likelihood of re-offense. And in three states, a defendant convicted of a capital crime will live or die based on what a judge and jury thinks he will do in an unknown future. It has been observed that "what separates the executioner from the murderer is the legal process by which the state ascertains and condemns those guilty of heinous crimes. If that process is flawed . . . the legitimacy of our legal process is threatened." When states execute based in part on the defendant’s future actions, the legal process is confronted with several complex questions. If they cannot be satisfactorily answered, the state risks collapsing the distinction between murderer and executioner.

This Comment collects and responds to several of the strongest arguments--stemming from both constitutional objections and more general concerns--against the use of future dangerousness as a consideration in death penalty sentencing.

NEW SEARCH


All SafetyLit records are available for automatic download to Zotero & Mendeley
Print