Citation

Benini A. Schweiz. Rundsch. Med. Prax. 1994; 83(8): 204-209.

Vernacular Title

Bewusstsein und Selbstbewusstsein als biologische Phanomene.

Affiliation

Neurochirurgische Klinik, Kantonsspital St. Gallen.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1994, Verlag Hans Huber)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

8134745

Abstract

Can there be a generally accepted account of consciousness? Consciousness is the main aspect of the mind-body problem and has intrigued man since he achieved the awareness of his own existence and identity, i.e. since he became self-conscious. The topic of consciousness spans the efforts of the humanist and naturalist, psychological, theological and physiological thinking and research. During the last years an upsurge of both neurophysiological and philosophical interest has tried to outline the place of consciousness and self-consciousness in the order of nature. 'Without consciousness, the mind-body problem would be much less interesting. With consciousness it seems hopeless', Nagel (16) wrote. Our thesis, supported by a significant part of today's epistemology (which takes up the believes of several main physiologists from the last century up to now), is that the question of consciousness and the mind-body problem are systematically and scientifically insoluble because the mind is fated to remain intrinsically mysterious to us. Thus, even though consciousness and self-consciousness belong to the intrinsic characteristics of our everyday life and experience, they seem to remain indefinable and mysterious and, therefore, to fall outside the scope of rational inquiry, defying both scientific and philosophical investigation. This assumption does not mean that neurophysiological sciences are unfeasible, but it is just an inquiry into their methodologic and cognitive limits.

Language: de