Citation

Lynn MT, Berger CC, Riddle TA, Morsella E. Conscious. Cogn. 2010; 19(4): 1007-1012.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, San Francisco State University, 1600 Holloway Avenue, EP 301, San Francisco, California 94132, United States.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, Elsevier Publishing)

DOI

10.1016/j.concog.2010.05.007

PMID

20542711

Abstract

Can one be fooled into believing that one intended an action that one in fact did not intend? Past experimental paradigms have demonstrated that participants, when provided with false perceptual feedback about their actions, can be fooled into misperceiving the nature of their intended motor act. However, because veridical proprioceptive/perceptual feedback limits the extent to which participants can be fooled, few studies have been able to answer our question and induce the illusion to intend. In a novel paradigm addressing this question, participants were instructed to move a line on the computer screen by use of a phony brain-computer interface. Line movements were actually controlled by computer program. Demonstrating the illusion to intend, participants reported more intentions to move the line when it moved frequently than when it moved infrequently. Consistent with ideomotor theory, the finding illuminates the intimate liaisons among ideomotor processing, the sense of agency, and action production.

Language: en