Citation

Leonardi PM. Soc. Stud. Sci. 2010; 40(2): 243-274.

Affiliation

Department of Communication Studies, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60201, USA. leonardi@northwestern.edu

Copyright

(Copyright © 2010, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

unavailable

PMID

20527322

Abstract

Today, in the midst of economic crisis, senior executives at US automakers and influential industry analysts frequently reflect on the progression that safety testing has taken from the crude trials done on the road, to controlled laboratory experiments, and to today's complex math-based simulation models. They use stories of this seemingly linear and natural sequence to justify further investment in simulation technologies. The analysis presented in this paper shows that change in the structures of automakers' organizations co-evolved with regulations specifying who was at fault in vehicle impacts, how vehicles should be built to withstand the force of an impact, and how testing should be done to assure that vehicles met those requirements. Changes in the regulatory environment were bolstered by new theories about crash test dynamics and changing technologies with which to test those theories. Thus, as new technological and regulatory innovations co-evolved with innovations in organizational structuring, ideas about how to best conduct crash tests shifted and catalyzed new cycles of technological, regulatory, and organizational innovation. However, this co-evolutionary story tells us that the move from road to lab to math was not natural or linear as today's managerial rhetoric would have us believe. Rather, the logic of math-based simulation was the result of technological, regulatory and organizational changes that created an industry-wide ideology that supported the move toward math while making it appear natural within the shifting structure of the industry.

Language: en