Citation

Musolino SV, Harper FT. Health Phys. 2006; 90(4): 377-385.

Affiliation

Brookhaven National Laboratory, Nonproliferation and National Security Department, P.O. Box 5000, Upton, NY 11973-5000, USA. musolino@bnl.gov

Erratum On

Health Phys 2007;93(1):87

Copyright

(Copyright © 2006, Health Physics Society, Publisher Lippincott Williams and Wilkins)

DOI

10.1097/01.HP.0000196111.16261.ed

PMID

16538143

Abstract

Strategies and decisions to protect emergency responders, the public, and critical infrastructure against the effects of a radiological dispersal device detonated outdoors must be made in the planning stage, not in the early period just after an attack. This contrasts with planning for small-scale types of radiological or nuclear emergencies, or for a large-scale nuclear-power-type accident that evolves over many hours or days before radioactivity is released to the environment, such that its effects can be prospectively modeled and analyzed. By the time it is known an attack has occurred, most likely there will have been casualties, all the radioactive material will have been released, plume growth will be progressing, and there will be no time left for evaluating possible countermeasures. This paper offers guidance to planners, first responders, and senior decision makers to assist them in developing strategies for protective actions and operational procedures for the first 48 hours after an explosive radiological dispersal device has been detonated.

Language: en