Citation

Orr A. Small Wars Insurg. 2009; 20(1): 87-117.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/09592310802573491

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The following article aims to examine current counter-insurgency (COIN) strategy in Afghanistan to posit an untried theoretical concept of operations for the war being waged there. By doing so it shall argue that Coalition and NATO forces operating there may be required to fundamentally recast Afghan war-policy if a resurgent Taliban and Al-Qa'eda are to be countered in both the military and political spheres of present day Afghanistan. By way of strategy this article shall posit that a more optimal strategy in Afghanistan, in light of the campaign's apparent difficulties, might be to seed local security apparatuses, designated herein as ‘Rural Paramilitary Forces’.