Citation

Döring SA. Emot. Rev. 2009; 1(3): 240-247.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, International Society for Research on Emotion, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/1754073909103592

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Almost all contemporary philosophers on the subject agree that emotions play an indispensable role in the justification (as opposed to the mere causation) of other mental states and actions. However, how this role is to be understood is still an open question. At the core of the debate is the phenomenon of conflict without contradiction: why is it that an emotion need not be revised in the light of better judgment and knowledge? Conflict without contradiction has been explained either by difference in content between emotion and judgment, or by a difference in the respective attitude towards content. I argue that conflict without contradiction is due to both differences, where difference in content is prior to difference in attitude.