Citation

Quigley J. Int. Crim. Justice Rev. 2009; 19(2): 115-131.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Georgia State University, College of Health and Human Sciences, Publisher SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/1057567709335396

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

This article explores the utility of genocide as a vehicle for the prosecution of individual persons and legal action against a state. It is suggested in the article that for prosecution of individual persons, other categories of offenses may be more effective, hence that genocide may be superfluous. It is suggested that, even though the Genocide Convention (1948) aimed primarily at defining an offense for which individuals would be prosecuted, genocide is an act for which states as well are legally responsible. Legal action against states in the International Court of Justice may be a more useful application of genocide, particularly because such action may aid in stopping atrocities as they are occurring whereas, criminal prosecutions typically are brought only after the fact. Several technical impediments, however, restrict the Court's capacity to deal with genocide, and they, it will be suggested, limit the Court's effectiveness in this regard.