Citation

Chin W. Contemp. Secur. Policy 2009; 30(1): 125-146.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2009, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/13523260902760330

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The United Kingdom has fought various iterations of terrorism for the better part of 100 years. In the aftermath of 9/11, the British believed that its previous experience provided it with a solid foundation upon which to develop a counterterrorist strategy to tackle this new threat. In spite of this experience, the fortunes of the United Kingdom in the current war on terror have deteriorated. This is most obvious in Iraq, where British efforts to stabilize the southeast of the country proved ineffective. The British are also experiencing significant problems in the second front of the war on terror in Afghanistan.

The purpose of this article is to explain why the UK's strategy and operations in the war on terror have so far failed to produce the desired strategic effect. Britain's counterterror strategy has been plagued by a five basic challenges: the nature of the enemy and the emergence new terrorism; the inability of the UK to articulate a coordinated counterterrorist/counterinsurgency strategy; the particular goals adopted to fight this war; and the resource challenges created by these operational and strategic objectives. The central argument is that British national and military strategy is fundamentally flawed because the UK has failed to pay sufficient attention to the basic preconditions required to generate a successful strategy. Because of this failure at the highest political level, the armed forces have faced the challenge of trying to reconcile a profound mismatch between resources and commitments.