Citation

Masters D, Alexander RM. Contemp. Secur. Policy 2008; 29(3): 434-452.

Copyright

(Copyright © 2008, Informa - Taylor and Francis Group)

DOI

10.1080/13523260802514787

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Current literature on the foreign policy process focuses almost entirely on elite packaging of foreign policy prospects with little attention to why the general population accepts or rejects their choices. A more complete understanding of the democratic foreign policy process requires knowing the conditions when people will accept elite guidance. We use prospect theory - model of decision-making that suggests people are inclined to escalate risks to avoid or recover losses - in order to understand the way in which context and emotions shape perceptions and support of foreign policy options. Prospect theory helps to explain the significance of elite behaviours such as threat inflation, which are designed to link discrete foreign policy actions to conditions related to intensely emotional events in order to advance a preferred policy.

To illustrate the utility of prospect theory to the foreign policy process, we turn to the Iraq War policy process, and why the Bush administration found a receptive audience to its public sale of the war. This study concludes that perceived losses in the security condition of the United States caused by the 9/11 terrorist attacks provided a context used to frame the decision for war with Iraq. The public sale of the war involved efforts by senior officials to link Saddam Hussein to terrorism and 9/11, casting a particular frame that was more likely to win acceptance of risk-seeking behaviour by the public. This, combined with a collapse in elite opposition that could counter-frame the option for war, contributed to an alignment in public perceptions of terrorist threats and support for offensive war with Iraq as a prospect to escape the threat of terrorism.