Citation

Kelman HC. Am. Psychol. 2007; 62(4): 287-303.

Affiliation

Department of Psychology, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA. hck@wjh.harvard.edu

Comment In:

Am Psychol. 2008 May-Jun;63(4):279-80; discussion 280-2

Copyright

(Copyright © 2007, American Psychological Association)

DOI

10.1037/0003-066X.62.4.287

PMID

17516774

Abstract

The vicissitudes of the Israeli-Palestinian peace process since 1967 are analyzed using attitudes and related concepts where relevant. The 1967 war returned the two peoples' zero-sum conflict around national identity to its origin as a conflict within the land both peoples claim. Gradually, new attitudes evolved regarding the necessity and possibility of negotiations toward a two-state solution based on mutual recognition, which became the building stones of the 1993 Oslo agreement. Lacking a commitment to a final outcome, the Oslo-based peace process was hampered by reserve options, which increased avoidance at the expense of approach tendencies as the parties moved toward a final agreement. The resulting breakdown of the process in 2000 produced clashing narratives, reflecting different anchors for judgment and classical mirror images. Public support for violence increased, even as public opinion continued to favor a negotiated two-state solution. Reviving the peace process requires mutual reassurance about the availability of a partner for negotiating a principled peace based on a historic compromise that meets the basic needs and validates the identities of both peoples.

Language: en