Citation

Stephens HW. Ind. Environ. Crisis Q. 1993; 7(3): 189-204.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1993, Industrial Crisis Institute - Bucknell University)

DOI

10.1177/108602669300700303

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

The explosion of two ships loaded with ammonium nitrate fertilizer at the Texas City docks on April 16 and 17, 1947, produced the worst industrial dis aster in United States history. Despite this, inaccuracies persist about exactly what happened, the event has never been analyzed in terms of crisis manage ment, and landside-waterside relationships are overlooked. This article applies the concepts of risk reduction, contingency planning, and incident response to these problems. Analysis reveals that the key elements of the Texas City Disaster were ignorance and complacency about hazardous materi als, system interaction, and a perceptual and organizational void between land and marine operations. Although safety practices have improved since 1947, uneven relationships between potential system interaction and disaster response capabilities persist at ports and along navigable waterways and con stitute the potential for future hazardous material disasters.