Citation

Underdal A. J. Peace Res. 1987; 24(2): 167-183.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1987, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234338702400206

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Why is effective international cooperation sometimes so hard to establish even when a seemingly convincing rationale can be given for its usefulness? Working from the assumption that accurate problem 'diagnosis' is a necessary, though not sufficient, condition for successful 'political engineering' of voluntary cooperation, the author starts out with an attempt at identifying the main political mechanisms of interdependence that can--if unchecked by adequate cooperative arrangements -- lead to suboptimal outcomes. He points to two such mechanisms: incongruity and cost-efficiency. The former is split into relationships of externalities and competition, the latter into relationships of synergy and contingencies. Using this typology as a basis, the author then proceeds to examine the problems involved m transforming the integrative potentials generated by each of these relationships into cooperative achievement. He shows that relationships characterized by incongruity, particularly those involving competition, are more 'malign' than are problems of cost-efficiency, and that the dynamics of adversanal bargaining implies an inherent risk of blocking, possibly even 'destroying', the integrative potential that provides the basic rationale for cooperation efforts.