Citation

Wolpin MD. J. Peace Res. 1978; 15(2): 89-107.

Copyright

(Copyright © 1978, SAGE Publishing)

DOI

10.1177/002234337801500201

PMID

unavailable

Abstract

Patterns of civil-military relations associated with ten deposed reformist regime are delineated. The case studies were selected because of their historical prominence and the consequent availability of information. They consist of: Iran's Mossadegh (1953), Guatemala's Arbenz (1954), the Dominican Republic's Bosch 1962), Brazil's Goulart (1964), Indonesia's Sukarno (1965), Ghana's Nkrumah (1966), Mali's Keita (1968), Cambodia's Sihanouk (1970), Bolivia's Torres (1971), and Chile's Allende (1973). Similarities are identified in the origins and composition of anti-reform coalitions. These include not only the traditional 'right', but also most politically active middle class sectors and associated Western interests. The United States played a major interventionist role in most of the 'destabilizations'. The autonomy, conservative norms, and external linkages of the military officer corps constituted a key problem for reform leadership, as did the openness of the political svstem to penetration by Western agencies. It is theorized that the style, assumptions, and tactical decisions by the overthrown reformers deprived them of political resources which in most cases would have increased the probability of a progressive outcome. This underlines the crucial role of ruthless and anticipatory leadership if opponents of structural change are to be neutralized. Those who were deposed suffered from excessive elitism, vacillation, and the assumption that compromise with opponents was a viable option until it was too late to seize the initiative. The Fidelista model is discussed as a more viable or realistic leadership approach.