TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2022//
TI  - Actual sequences, Frankfurt-cases, and non-accidentality
JO  - Inquiry : an interdisciplinary journal of philosophy and the social sciences
A1  - Heering, David
SP  - 1269
EP  - 1288
VL  - 65
IS  - 10
N2  - There are two tenets about free agency that have proven difficult to combine: (i) free agency is grounded in an agent's possession or exercise of their reasons-responsiveness, (ii) only actual sequence features (not alternative possibilities) can ground free agency (conclusion of Frankfurt-Cases). This paper argues that (i) and (ii) can only be reconciled if we recognise that their clash is just the particular manifestation of a wider conflict between two approaches to the notion of non-accidentality. According to modalism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff p modally tracks q. According to explanationism, p is non-accidentally connected to q iff q explains p in the right way. The conflict between these two approaches becomes manifest in Frankfurt-like cases for many notions, in which p and q are intuitively non-accidentally connected (because they share the right explanatory connection) even though there is no modal tracking between them. Thus, (i) and (ii) can't be combined because the Frankfurt-cases upon which (ii) rests track explanationist intuitions, while the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness in (i) is usually spelled out in modalist terms. Hence, the possibility of an actual sequence reasons-responsiveness account depends on finding an explanationist approach to the non-accidentality requirement of reasons-responsiveness.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0020-174X
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2021.1904644
ID  - ref1
ER  -