TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2019//
TI  - Tax design in the alcohol market
JO  - Journal of public economics
A1  - Griffith, Rachel
A1  - O'Connell, Martin
A1  - Smith, Kate
SP  - 20
EP  - 35
VL  - 172
IS  - 
N2  - Alcohol consumption generates negative externalities that are non-linear in the total amount of alcohol consumed. If tastes for products are heterogeneous and correlated with marginal externalities, then varying tax rates on different products can lead to welfare gains. We study this problem in an optimal tax framework and empirically for the UK market. We find that heavy drinkers have systematically different patterns of alcohol demands and welfare gains from optimally varying rates are higher the more concentrated externalities are among heavy drinkers.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0047-2727
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.12.005
ID  - ref1
ER  -