TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2019//
TI  - The credit incentive to be a maverick
JO  - Studies in history and philosophy of science
A1  - Heesen, Remco
SP  - 5
EP  - 12
VL  - 76
IS  - 
N2  - There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue that (even in theory) this idea is less straightforward than it may seem. Interpreting mavericks as scientists who prioritize rewards over speed and risk, I show in a deliberatively simple model that there is a fixed mixture which is not particularly likely to be desirable and which credit incentives cannot alter. I consider a way around this result, but this has some major drawbacks. I conclude that credit incentives are not as promising a way to create a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers as one might have thought.<br><br>Copyright © 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0039-3681
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007
ID  - ref1
ER  -