TY - JOUR PY - 2016// TI - Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads JO - Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America A1 - Kemp, R. Scott A1 - Danagoulian, Areg A1 - Macdonald, Ruaridh R. A1 - Vavrek, Jayson R. SP - 8618 EP - 8623 VL - 113 IS - 31 N2 - How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.

Language: en

LA - en SN - 0027-8424 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1603916113 ID - ref1 ER -