TY - JOUR PY - 1997// TI - Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements JO - International review of law and economics A1 - Garoupa, Nuno SP - 521 EP - 535 VL - 17 IS - 4 N2 - In this paper, we extend the optimal law enforcement model to the illegal trade and consumption of narcotics. Three sources of risk in the narcotic business are considered: (1) The consumer can be detected while consuming narcotics; (2) the consumer and the retailer can be detected at the time of sale to the consumer; and (3) the retailer and the producer can be detected at the time of sale to the retailer. We derive the two levels of market equilibrium and a set of comparative static results. The welfare analysis is used to comment on the Schengen Agreements and the implications for the market of narcotics.

LA - SN - 0144-8188 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00034-3 ID - ref1 ER -