TY  - JOUR
PY  - 1997//
TI  - Casual police corruption and the economics of crime
JO  - International review of law and economics
A1  - Bowles, Roger Arthur
A1  - Garoupa, Nuno
SP  - 75
EP  - 87
VL  - 17
IS  - 1
N2  - We extend Becker's model of crime by allowing for collusion between an arresting officer and the criminal at the expense of the police department. The weakening in the deterrent power of a given set of criminal sanctions that results is explored in a perfect information setting. Applying a solution concept developed in related work by Cadot we derive optimal policies for each group. We show in particular that the well-established results from the Becker model do not all carry through. In particular we find that the maximal fine may no longer be optimal.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0144-8188
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7
ID  - ref1
ER  -