TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2009//
TI  - Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts
JO  - International review of law and economics
A1  - Grajzl, Peter
A1  - Baniak, Andrzej
SP  - 360
EP  - 374
VL  - 29
IS  - 4
N2  - We characterize the comparative efficiency of industry self-regulation as means of social control of torts. Unlike liability, which is imposed by courts ex post, industry self-regulation, much like government regulation, acts before the harm is done. As compared to government regulators, however, the industry regulates with superior information. Furthermore, a pro-industry bias inherent to self-regulation also arises under alternative institutional arrangements when adjudicators are vulnerable to pressure by industry members. We show when industry self-regulation is socially desirable and feasible, and clarify when it could be an attractive institutional arrangement for developing and transition countries.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0144-8188
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.03.004
ID  - ref1
ER  -