TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2007//
TI  - Escalating penalties for repeat offenders
JO  - International review of law and economics
A1  - Emons, Winand
SP  - 170
EP  - 178
VL  - 27
IS  - 2
N2  - Agents may commit a crime twice. The act is inefficient so that the agents are to be deterred. Even if an agent is law abiding, she may still commit the act accidentally. The agents are wealth constrained. The government seeks to minimize the probability of apprehension. If the benefit from the crime is small, the optimal sanction scheme is decreasing in the number of offenses. By contrast, if the benefit is large, sanctions are increasing in the number of offenses. Increasing sanctions do not make the criminal track less attractive; they make being honest more attractive.<p /> 
LA  - 
SN  - 0144-8188
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2007.06.005
ID  - ref1
ER  -