TY  - JOUR
PY  - 2012//
TI  - Artificial distinction and real discrimination
JO  - Journal of theoretical biology
A1  - Inarra, Elena
A1  - Laruelle, Annick
SP  - 110
EP  - 117
VL  - 305
IS  - 
N2  - In this paper we consider the hawk-dove game played by a finite population formed by two types of individual who fail to recognize their own type but do observe the type of their opponent. In this game we find two evolutionarily stable strategies and show that in each of them one type of individuals suffers more aggression than the other. When a continuum of individuals is considered there are no evolutionarily stable strategies but neutrally stable strategies.<p />  <p>Language: en</p>
LA  - en
SN  - 0022-5193
UR  - http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jtbi.2012.03.034
ID  - ref1
ER  -