TY - JOUR PY - 1973// TI - Stability and Deterrence Through Strategic Nuclear Arms JO - Journal of peace research A1 - Afheldt, H. A1 - Sonntag, P. SP - 245 EP - 250 VL - 10 IS - 3 N2 - A quantitative simulation is carried out in order to test the political outcome of ABM and MIRVs. Technical variables serve as input: number of ICBMs, of ABMs, hit probabilities, etc. Strategic positions result as output: mutual second strike capability, effective defense of one power only, etc. The conclusion is that MIRVs, especially in com bination with ABMs, represent an extreme threat to equilibrium.

LA - SN - 0022-3433 UR - http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002234337301000308 ID - ref1 ER -