%0 Journal Article %T A rent-seeking model of international competition and alliances %J Defence economics %D 1993 %A Linster, Bruce G. %V 4 %N 3 %P 213-226 %X This paper presents an alternative approach for analyzing international competition and alliances as rent-seeking contests that are able to capture the impure public good nature of defense spending. Two-country Cournot and Stackelberg games are considered and comparative static results derived. A three-country model is investigated, and alliance behavior is explored in the context of this rent-seeking model. The conjecture that an alliance may become less effective if the allies' interests become more closely aligned is verified. Finally, the model is generalized, and a Nash-Cournot equilibrium is computed.

%G %I Informa - Taylor and Francis Group %@ 1043-0717 %U http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10430719308404761