%0 Journal Article
%T Communication networks and collective action
%J Social networks
%D 1987
%A Bonacich, Phillip
%V 9
%N 4
%P 389-396
%X When individuals in a group have incentives to hoard information, the group may be less effective in achieving its goals. Mixed motives both to communicate and accumulate information create a "social dilemma" in which group and individual goals are in conflict. The results of a series of computer simulations are described in which it is shown that there is a curvilinear relationship between the centralization of a network and its vulnerability to this type of conflict; highly centralized and highly decentralized networks are the least vulnerable.<p />
%G 
%I Elsevier Publishing
%@ 0378-8733
%U http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(87)90006-2