@article{ref1,
title="The meaningful life and the life in dignity in medical ethics",
journal="Ethik in der Medizin",
year="2021",
author="Muders, S.",
volume="33",
number="4",
pages="503-520",
abstract="Definition of the problem: In medical ethics, moral reasons concerning the patient's dignity have become firmly established as an important basis for practical considerations, especially in end-of-life issues, alongside those concerning well-being and autonomy. In this context, it has become customary to distinguish between considerations that focus on the contingent dignity of a person and those that refer to the non-contingent dignity of its bearers. In this essay, I would like to draw attention to another deliberative starting point that threatens to be obscured by considerations that take their starting point from the human dignity of the persons concerned in both ways: moral reasons that are dedicated to the preservation or enhancement of meaning that people see or miss in their lives. Arguments: These reasons for meaning, I argue, share some structural commonalities with considerations of dignity that can be traced to a common ontological foundation and overlapping contents of both. This fact notwithstanding, both types of reasons have independent functions in thinking about moral problems. <br><br>CONCLUSION: Especially in the case of moral challenges at the end of life, reasons of meaning often even have primacy in the sense that they can enter constitutively into reasons of dignity and also point independently to morally relevant considerations. © 2021, The Author(s).<p /><p>Language: de</p>",
language="de",
issn="0935-7335",
doi="10.1007/s00481-021-00649-8",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00481-021-00649-8"
}