@article{ref1,
title="Mechanism design for on-demand first-mile ridesharing",
journal="Transportation research part B: methodological",
year="2020",
author="Liu, Xiang and Bai, Yun and Bian, Zheyong",
volume="138",
number="",
pages="77-117",
abstract="Ridesharing emerges as a viable way to bridge the first-mile accessibility gap to public transit. There is particularly a high demand for the first-mile ridesharing service in transit-intensive metropolitan areas. This paper studies the mechanism design problem in order to promote passengers' participation in the on-demand first-mile ridesharing accounting for passengers' mobility preferences, including passengers' requirements on arrival deadlines, maximum willing-to-pay prices, and detour tolerances. A rolling horizon planning approach is used to process spontaneous on-demand passenger requests. We propose a novel mechanism, namely &quot;Mobility-Preference-Based Mechanism with Baseline Price Control&quot; (MPMBPC), which adapts the traditional Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and incorporates a baseline price control component. MPMBPC is proved to satisfy several important mechanism design properties, including &quot;individual rationality&quot;, &quot;incentive compatibility&quot;, &quot;price controllability&quot;, and &quot;detour discounting reasonability&quot;. In comparison with the traditional general-purpose VCG mechanism, MPMBPC can avoid unreasonably low prices and prevent carriers' deficits. A computationally efficient heuristic algorithm called Solution Pooling Approach (SPA) is developed to solve large-scale ridesharing mechanism design problems. Numerical examples are developed to demonstrate that SPA can solve large-scale ridesharing mechanism design problems in a computationally efficient way, with satisfactory solution qualities.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0191-2615",
doi="10.1016/j.trb.2020.03.011",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.trb.2020.03.011"
}