@article{ref1,
title="The credit incentive to be a maverick",
journal="Studies in history and philosophy of science",
year="2019",
author="Heesen, Remco",
volume="76",
number="",
pages="5-12",
abstract="There is a commonly made distinction between two types of scientists: risk-taking, trailblazing mavericks and detail-oriented followers. A number of recent papers have discussed the question what a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers looks like. Answering this question is most useful if a scientific community can be steered toward such a desirable mixture. One attractive route is through credit incentives: manipulating rewards so that reward-seeking scientists are likely to form the desired mixture of their own accord. Here I argue that (even in theory) this idea is less straightforward than it may seem. Interpreting mavericks as scientists who prioritize rewards over speed and risk, I show in a deliberatively simple model that there is a fixed mixture which is not particularly likely to be desirable and which credit incentives cannot alter. I consider a way around this result, but this has some major drawbacks. I conclude that credit incentives are not as promising a way to create a desirable mixture of mavericks and followers as one might have thought.<br><br>Copyright © 2018 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd.. All rights reserved.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0039-3681",
doi="10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2018.11.007"
}