@article{ref1,
title="Plea bargaining with multiple defendants and its deterrence effect",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2018",
author="Berg, Nathan and Kim, Jeong-Yoo",
volume="55",
number="",
pages="58-70",
abstract="This article analyzes a model of plea bargaining with multiple co-defendants. We characterize equilibrium as separating or pooling, depending on the relative importance of type-I and type-II errors. Effects of plea bargaining on criminal incentives are examined in an extended model. Contrary to the widespread perception of being &quot;soft&quot; on crime by weakening deterrence, we show that plea bargaining unambiguously reduces crime. The benefit of improved informational efficiency more than offsets the crime-incentivizing effect of offering discounted sentences to defendants who plea bargain. Plea bargaining is therefore socially efficient whenever the risk of wrongfully convicting innocent defendants is sufficiently small.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2018.04.002",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2018.04.002"
}