@article{ref1,
title="The "hearts and minds" fallacy: violence, coercion, and success in counterinsurgency warfare",
journal="International security",
year="2017",
author="Hazelton, Jacqueline L.",
volume="42",
number="1",
pages="80-113",
abstract="Debates over how governments can defeat insurgencies ebb and flow with international events, becoming particularly contentious when the United States encounters problems in its efforts to support a counterinsurgent government. Often the United States confronts these problems as a zero-sum game in which the government and the insurgents compete for popular support and cooperation. The U.S. prescription for success has had two main elements: to support liberalizing, democratizing reforms to reduce popular grievances; and to pursue a military strategy that carefully targets insurgents while avoiding harming civilians. An analysis of contemporaneous documents and interviews with participants in three cases held up as models of the governance approach--Malaya, Dhofar, and El Salvador--shows that counterinsurgency success is the result of a violent process of state building in which elites contest for power, popular interests matter little, and the government benefits from uses of force against civilians.    © 2017 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0162-2889",
doi="10.1162/ISEC_a_00283",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00283"
}