@article{ref1,
title="Rape, truth, and hearsay",
journal="Harvard journal of law and gender",
year="2017",
author="Capers, Bennett",
volume="40",
number="",
pages="183-228",
abstract="Though known among Evidence scholars, Stephens v. Miller is not a ground-breaking case. In applying a rape shield law to the &quot;she said, he said&quot; facts before it--she said her acquaintance attempted to rape her, he said they had consensual sex--and in wrestling with whether the application of the rape shield deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to present a defense, the Seventh Circuit en banc opinion forged no new law. Instead, the plurality engaged in a rather straightforward, even predictable, analysis. The opinion's references to &quot;doggy fashion&quot; sex may give the case some singularity. But as far as cases go, Stephens v. Miller is not canonical. One could even say the case is non-exceptional, at least insofar as any sexual assault case can be described as non-exceptional.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1558-4356",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}