@article{ref1,
title="'Look like the innocent flower, but be the serpent under't': mimicking behaviour of growth-oriented terrorist organizations",
journal="Defence and peace economics",
year="2016",
author="Hendel, Ulrich",
volume="27",
number="5",
pages="665-687",
abstract="This paper examines the interaction between a growth-oriented terrorist organization and an uninformed government based on a two-period signalling game. Combining the signalling game and organizational growth approaches of previous contributions, this paper shows that, if a terrorist group follows a growth strategy, it has an incentive to appear weaker than it is by mimicking the behaviour of a smaller organization. Depending on its beliefs about the extent of the terrorist threat, it can be optimal for a government to spend more on second-period counter-terrorism measures if it is not attacked in the first period than if it were attacked.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="1024-2694",
doi="10.1080/10242694.2014.996006",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10242694.2014.996006"
}