@article{ref1,
title="Physical cryptographic verification of nuclear warheads",
journal="Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America",
year="2016",
author="Kemp, R. Scott and Danagoulian, Areg and Macdonald, Ruaridh R. and Vavrek, Jayson R.",
volume="113",
number="31",
pages="8618-8623",
abstract="How does one prove a claim about a highly sensitive object such as a nuclear weapon without revealing information about the object? This paradox has challenged nuclear arms control for more than five decades. We present a mechanism in the form of an interactive proof system that can validate the structure and composition of an object, such as a nuclear warhead, to arbitrary precision without revealing either its structure or composition. We introduce a tomographic method that simultaneously resolves both the geometric and isotopic makeup of an object. We also introduce a method of protecting information using a provably secure cryptographic hash that does not rely on electronics or software. These techniques, when combined with a suitable protocol, constitute an interactive proof system that could reject hoax items and clear authentic warheads with excellent sensitivity in reasonably short measurement times.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0027-8424",
doi="10.1073/pnas.1603916113",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1603916113"
}