@article{ref1,
title="David Hume's no-miracles argument begets a valid No-Miracles Argument",
journal="Studies in history and philosophy of science",
year="2015",
author="Howson, Colin",
volume="54",
number="",
pages="41-45",
abstract="Hume's essay 'Of Miracles' has been a focus of controversy ever since its publication. The challenge to Christian orthodoxy was only too evident, but the balance-of-probabilities criterion advanced by Hume for determining when testimony justifies belief in miracles has also been a subject of contention among philosophers. The temptation for those familiar with Bayesian methodology to show that Hume's criterion determines a corresponding balance-of-posterior probabilities in favour of miracles is understandable, but I will argue that their attempts fail. However, I show that his criterion generates a valid form of the so-called No-Miracles Argument appealed to by modern realist philosophers, whose own presentation of it, despite their possession of the probabilistic machinery Hume himself lacked, is invalid.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0039-3681",
doi="10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.08.011",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shpsa.2015.08.011"
}