@article{ref1,
title="Young children's understanding of fact beliefs versus value beliefs",
journal="Child development",
year="1990",
author="Flavell, J. H. and Flavell, E. R. and Green, F. L. and Moses, L. J.",
volume="61",
number="4",
pages="915-928",
abstract="Recent research on the development of children's knowledge about the mind has shown that young 3-year-olds have difficulty inferring that another person holds a false belief about a matter of verifiable fact, even when provided with considerable help. 4 studies tested the hypothesis that they would have less difficulty inferring that another person holds an odd, nonnormative belief about a matter of taste or value--one which, like the false fact belief, they themselves do not hold. On fact-belief tasks, an experimenter acted as if, or even explicitly stated that, she believed that the contents of a container were other than what the children knew to be the case. On value-belief tasks, she behaved as if she believed that a stimulus had a good or bad taste, smell, or appearance, whereas they thought it had the opposite. The results of all 4 studies confirmed the hypothesis.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0009-3920",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}