@article{ref1,
title="Punishment as deterrence: reply to Sprague",
journal="Philosophical quarterly",
year="2005",
author="Ellis, Anthony",
volume="55",
number="218",
pages="98-101",
abstract="In my 'A Deterrence Theory of Punishment', I argued that a deterrence system of punishment can avoid the charge that it illegitimately uses offenders if its punishments are carried out 'quasi-automatically': threats are issued by a legislature for deterrent purposes, but those who carry out the punishments have no authority to take deterrent considerations into account. Sprague has objected that under such a system, those who carry out punishments will be unable to justify their actions. I reply that if it is justifiable to set up the system in this way in the first place, then this justification will transmit to all actions carried out under it; and that it is justifiable to set up an institution of punishment in this way.<p /><p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0031-8094",
doi="10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00388.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00388.x"
}