@article{ref1,
title="On offense history and the theory of deterrence",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="1998",
author="Polinsky, A.Mitchell and Shavell, Steven",
volume="18",
number="3",
pages="305-324",
abstract="This article uses a two-period version of the standard economic model of deterrence to study whether sanctions should depend on an individual's record of prior convictions--his offense history. The principal contribution of the article is to demonstrate that it may be optimal to treat repeat offenders disadvantageously because such a policy serves to enhance deterrence: When an individual contemplates committing an offense in the first period, he will realize that if he is caught, not only will he bear an immediate sanction, but also--because he will have a record--any sanction that he bears in the second period will be higher than it would be otherwise.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00009-X",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(98)00009-X"
}