@article{ref1,
title="Optimal law enforcement and the economics of the drug market: Some comments on the Schengen Agreements",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="1997",
author="Garoupa, Nuno",
volume="17",
number="4",
pages="521-535",
abstract="In this paper, we extend the optimal law enforcement model to the illegal trade and consumption of narcotics. Three sources of risk in the narcotic business are considered: (1) The consumer can be detected while consuming narcotics; (2) the consumer and the retailer can be detected at the time of sale to the consumer; and (3) the retailer and the producer can be detected at the time of sale to the retailer. We derive the two levels of market equilibrium and a set of comparative static results. The welfare analysis is used to comment on the Schengen Agreements and the implications for the market of narcotics.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00034-3",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00034-3"
}