@article{ref1,
title="A note on private enforcement and type-I error",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="1997",
author="Garoupa, Nuno",
volume="17",
number="3",
pages="423-429",
abstract="It is a common belief that private law enforcement leads to more nonoffenders being charged as a consequence of profit maximization. In this note we argue that monopolistic enforcement leads in many circumstances to underdetection and less accuracy. The use of a monetary sanction (subsidy) to penalize (compensate) the monopolistic enforcement agency when a charged individual is set free solves the problem.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00017-3",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(97)00017-3"
}