@article{ref1,
title="Casual police corruption and the economics of crime",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="1997",
author="Bowles, Roger Arthur and Garoupa, Nuno",
volume="17",
number="1",
pages="75-87",
abstract="We extend Becker's model of crime by allowing for collusion between an arresting officer and the criminal at the expense of the police department. The weakening in the deterrent power of a given set of criminal sanctions that results is explored in a perfect information setting. Applying a solution concept developed in related work by Cadot we derive optimal policies for each group. We show in particular that the well-established results from the Becker model do not all carry through. In particular we find that the maximal fine may no longer be optimal.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(96)00056-7"
}