@article{ref1,
title="How optimal penalties change with the amount of harm",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="1995",
author="Rasmusen, Eric",
volume="15",
number="1",
pages="101-108",
abstract="Intuition tells us that the optimal penalty and court care to avoid error should rise smoothly with the harm to the victim. This is not always correct; sometimes the optimal penalty and level of court care increase discontinuously with harm, even when penalties deter harm and court care reduces error continuously. This is shown in a model in which the social cost of crime consists of its direct harm, the cost of court care, and the cost of false convictions.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/0144-8188(94)00008-I",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0144-8188(94)00008-I"
}