@article{ref1,
title="Welfare enhancing regulation exemptions",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2011",
author="Mungan, Murat C.",
volume="31",
number="4",
pages="249-255",
abstract="Sanctions for regulation violations are used to deter conduct which could potentially result in great social harms. This practice over-deters low-risk entities and under-deters high-risk entities, which leads to social losses. This paper analyzes whether and how such social losses can be mitigated. I show that this can be achieved by allowing regulatees to purchase passes exempting them from regulations at appropriate prices, although they remain liable for any harm they cause.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2011.06.002",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2011.06.002"
}