@article{ref1,
title="Industry self-regulation, subversion of public institutions, and social control of torts",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2009",
author="Grajzl, Peter and Baniak, Andrzej",
volume="29",
number="4",
pages="360-374",
abstract="We characterize the comparative efficiency of industry self-regulation as means of social control of torts. Unlike liability, which is imposed by courts ex post, industry self-regulation, much like government regulation, acts before the harm is done. As compared to government regulators, however, the industry regulates with superior information. Furthermore, a pro-industry bias inherent to self-regulation also arises under alternative institutional arrangements when adjudicators are vulnerable to pressure by industry members. We show when industry self-regulation is socially desirable and feasible, and clarify when it could be an attractive institutional arrangement for developing and transition countries.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2009.03.004",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2009.03.004"
}