@article{ref1,
title="Enforcement costs, optimal sanctions, and the choice between ex-post liability and ex-ante regulation",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2004",
author="Innes, Robert",
volume="24",
number="1",
pages="29-48",
abstract="This paper studies an integrated government choice of enforcement, liability design, and regulatory policy in a model of unilateral accidents, the risk of which can be reduced when firms exercise &quot;care.&quot; The analysis imparts new motives to two observed features of government policy. First, the direct ex-ante regulation of care can be more efficient than imposing ex-post liability for harm even when the government's cost of monitoring care (as required under ex-ante regulation) is significantly higher than the cost of monitoring accidents (as needed under ex-post liability). Second, in both ex-ante and ex-post regulatory regimes, optimal care-contingent sanctions take a familiar &quot;negligence&quot; form, completely exempting non-negligent firms from liability.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/j.irle.2004.03.003",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.irle.2004.03.003"
}