@article{ref1,
title="Casual police corruption and the economics of crime:: Further results",
journal="International review of law and economics",
year="2000",
author="Chang, Juin-jen and Lai, Ching-chong and Yang, C.C.",
volume="20",
number="1",
pages="35-51",
abstract="This article revisits the Bowles-Garoupa model with regard to corruption and crime. We interpret additional costs inflicted on a caught corrupt officer as psychological costs, and we incorporate social norms into these psychological costs. In the Bowles-Garoupa model, the deterrent effect of raising fines on crime is weakened but is not perverse in the presence of corruption. Here, due to the &quot;snowballing&quot; character of social norms, raising fines could be counterproductive in deterring crimes if the status quo corruption is widespread. As a corollary, the optimality of the maximal fine suggested by Becker need not be true even if corruption is harmless.<p />",
language="",
issn="0144-8188",
doi="10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00020-X",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0144-8188(00)00020-X"
}