@article{ref1,
title="Right action and the non‐virtuous agent",
journal="Journal of applied philosophy",
year="2011",
author="van Zyl, Liezl",
volume="28",
number="1",
pages="80-92",
abstract="According to qualified-agent virtue ethics, an action is right if and only if it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances. I discuss two closely related objections to this view, both of which concern the actions of the non-virtuous. The first is that this criterion sometimes gives the wrong result, for in some cases a non-virtuous agent should not do what a virtuous person would characteristically do. A second objection is it altogether fails to apply whenever the agent, through previous wrongdoing, finds herself in circumstances that a virtuous person cannot be in. I focus on Rosalind Hursthouse's account of right action, and argue that it can provide a satisfactory response to both these objections. I do so by drawing attention to the distinction between action guidance and action assessment, and arguing that while the above criterion is adequate as a means of action assessment, we should turn to the virtue- and vice-rules (v-rules) for action guidance.<p /> <p>Language: en</p>",
language="en",
issn="0264-3758",
doi="10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00514.x",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5930.2010.00514.x"
}