@article{ref1,
title="Communication networks and collective action",
journal="Social networks",
year="1987",
author="Bonacich, Phillip",
volume="9",
number="4",
pages="389-396",
abstract="When individuals in a group have incentives to hoard information, the group may be less effective in achieving its goals. Mixed motives both to communicate and accumulate information create a &quot;social dilemma&quot; in which group and individual goals are in conflict. The results of a series of computer simulations are described in which it is shown that there is a curvilinear relationship between the centralization of a network and its vulnerability to this type of conflict; highly centralized and highly decentralized networks are the least vulnerable.<p />",
language="",
issn="0378-8733",
doi="10.1016/0378-8733(87)90006-2",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0378-8733(87)90006-2"
}