@article{ref1,
title="The uneasy entente between legal insanity and mens rea: Beyond Clark v. Arizona",
journal="Journal of criminal law and criminology",
year="2007",
author="Morse, S. J. and Hoffman, MB",
volume="97",
number="4",
pages="1071-1149",
abstract="This Article considers the meaning and relation of legal insanity and mens rea, using the Supreme Court's recent decision, Clark v. Arizona, which addressed both, as the focus of discussion. It suggests that rules limiting the introduction of evidence of mental disorder to negate mens rea are unjust and that fair blame and punishment require retaining an insanity defense. Alternatives to the insanity defense are rejected because they are analytically unconvincing or unfair. The Article also addresses recent challenges to the very possibility of criminal responsibility that are based on new discoveries in neuroscience and behavioral science. It concludes that these challenges are conceptually, empirically, and normatively unjustified. Finally, it proposes that legal insanity cannot be consensually defined morally or scientifically, but that the human capacity for rationality is the key to the normative debate about responsibility.<p />",
language="",
issn="0091-4169",
doi="",
url="http://dx.doi.org/"
}