@article{ref1,
title="Stability and Deterrence Through Strategic Nuclear Arms",
journal="Journal of peace research",
year="1973",
author="Afheldt, H. and Sonntag, P.",
volume="10",
number="3",
pages="245-250",
abstract="A quantitative simulation is carried out in order to test the political outcome of ABM and MIRVs. Technical variables serve as input: number of ICBMs, of ABMs, hit probabilities, etc. Strategic positions result as output: mutual second strike capability, effective defense of one power only, etc. The conclusion is that MIRVs, especially in com bination with ABMs, represent an extreme threat to equilibrium.<p />",
language="",
issn="0022-3433",
doi="10.1177/002234337301000308",
url="http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/002234337301000308"
}